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IN MEMORIAL 
 
On September 15, 2005, 41 
year old Niagara Regional 
Police Service Constable 
Daniel Rathonyi was 
participating in a fitness 
appraisal to become a 
member of the Emergency Task Force Unit. 
After finishing the test, he collapsed. Other 
officers tried to give him first aid but were 
unsuccessful. 
 
Constable Rathonyi began his career with the 
Niagara Regional Police 
Service in 2000 and was 
currently assigned to Uniform 
Patrol duties in Niagara Falls.  
He is survived by his wife, son 
and daughter. 
 
On November 5, 2005, two Wildlife Protection 
Officers and an experienced pilot died when 
their plane crashed. Wildlife Protection Officer 
Nicolas Rochette and Wildlife Protection 
Officer Fernand Vachon, along with the pilot 
Yves Giguère, were conducting a night-hunting 
operation in the Chaudière-Appalaches area 
(approximately 30 miles north of the U.S. 
border) when the crash occurred.  
 
Wildlife Protection Officer Nicolas Rochette 
began his wildlife protection career in 
Forestville. In 1997 he was 
appointed wildlife protection 
officer for Laurier-Station 
and Saint-Camille. He took his 
career very seriously, and was 
a guest on the Radio Canada 
 
 
program Justice, which examined the duties of 
wildlife protection officers. His concern for the 
human aspects of his job also led him to accept a 
position as union representative. Working in the 
Chaudière - Appalaches region, Wildlife 
Protection Officer Rochette frequently took 
part in aerial surveillance of night-time white-
tailed deer hunting and his efforts were greatly 
appreciated. Over the years he was involved in 
numerous poaching prevention initiatives and was 
known for his sense of initiative and 
productivity. He is survived by his daughter. 
 
 
Wildlife Protection Officer Fernand Vachon 
first became a wildlife protection officer in 
1972. He was appointed Wildlife Protection 
Office unit commander for Thetford-Mines and 
Laurier-Station in 2000 and went on to develop 
new working methods as well as an innovative 
approach to the poaching of white-tailed deer 
involving a combination of ground work and aerial 
patrols. Wildlife Protection Officer Vachon was 
known for his expertise, professionalism, and 
persistence. He was an inspiration to his 
colleagues from Québec in the battle against 
poaching. Wildlife protection 
was his passion, and he devoted 
33 years of his life to the 
cause with the enthusiasm and 
commitment that were his 
trademark. 
 
The preceding information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page: 
available at www.odmp.org/Canada 
 
“They are our heroes, 
We shall not forget them” 
 
 2            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 5 Issue 6 
  November/December 2005 
 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
“I miss getting the 
newsletter since I 
graduated from the JI in 
January 2004.  I go on-line 
occasionally and read it but I 
would like to get it at work...[T]he rest of my 
squad would like to read it also and I can make 
copies of it there.  Thanks very much, it is a very 
informative read and a good way to stay up 
to date"—Police Constable, British Columbia 
************ 
“The edition of your latest newsletter (Volume 5, 
Issue 5) was just forwarded to me by a… 
constable. I found the information well put 
together and easy to read. Great job!”—Police 
Sergeant, Alberta 
************ 
“I’m a Sergeant…and read your newsletter.  It 
was extremely informative and would like to be 
on your mailing list”—Police Sergeant, Alberta 
************ 
“I was hoping that you could add me to your 
distribution list for your newsletter.  The 
articles are excellent tools for any police officer 
to stay up to date on current legislation.  I 
appreciate the quality of your work and look 
forward to future readings”—Police Constable, 
Alberta 
************ 
“I have never seen this publication before and I 
noted several very informative cases and would 
ask that you place me on your electronic 
distribution list so that I can share [In] Service 
10-8 with the other members of our unit”—RCMP 
Corporal, British Columbia 
************ 
“Love your newsletter”—RCMP Constable, 
British Columbia 
************ 
“I find your publication extremely informative 
and practical for operational members. Thank 
you”—RCMP Corporal, British Columbia 
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 All past editions of this 
newsletter are available online 
by clicking on the Police 
Academy link at:  
www.jibc.bc.ca 
 
DESTROYED DISC BREACHES 
DISCLOSURE RULES 
R. v. Forster et al, 2005 SKCA 107 
 
A police officer conducted a drug 
investigation using confidential 
informants, electrical consumption 
records, infrared imaging, drive-
bys and other information to build his grounds for 
a search warrant. His many observations were 
committed to memory or written on his hands or 
scraps of paper and then were edited and 
recorded onto a computer disc. This information 
then formed the contents of the information to 
obtain the search warrant. The computer disc and 
all of the original notes and source information 
were destroyed by the officer except those 
related to the execution of the search warrant. 
This left the entire original record of the six to 
seven month investigation destroyed after the 
officer used its contents to draft the information 
to obtain. 
 
The three accused were charged with growing 
marihuana and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. The Crown disclosed the notes made 
during the execution of the warrant and a copy 
of the information to obtain, which had 
information blacked out to protect the identity 
of the confidential informants. At the beginning 
of the trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court 
the charges were stayed because the officer 
destroyed the source material and computer 
disc which breached the Crown’s duty in 
preserving material produced during the 
investigation. The Crown appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.  
 
Non disclosure of evidence can result in such 
prejudice to an accused that their s.7 Charter 
right to full answer and defence, a principle of 
fundamental justice, will be violated. In 
determining whether a s.7 breach has occurred 
from the destruction of documents, a two prong 
enquiry will be undertaken. First, were the 
destroyed notes and disc relevant evidence. And 
second, if the evidence was relevant, did the 
Crown fail to meet its obligation to preserve 
that evidence.  
 
In this case Justice Sherstobitoff, writing the 
judgment of the court, concluded that both 
branches of the test had been met. In ruling on 
the first branch, whether the destroyed 
material was relevant evidence, he wrote: 
 
While the officer swore that everything on 
the disc was contained in the Information, it is 
obvious that the conversion of that 
information from the form of entries made 
from time to time over a period of many 
months into the form of an Information to 
Obtain a Search Warrant involved not only 
reorganizing, rewording and editing all of the 
material, but, almost certainly, some selection 
and discarding of material that was, in the 
opinion of the officer, not significant or 
useful.  These processes would, in all 
likelihood, put all of the information in the 
very best light for the Crown in its application 
for the search warrant, as opposed to its 
original form, and would tend to minimize the 
aspects unfavourable to the success of the 
application.  They would have certainly changed 
the form of the content of the disc, and very 
probably, to some degree, also the substance 
of the content of the disc.  Those changes 
could have been of use to the defence. 
 
In addition, it must be borne in mind that 
there were two kinds of notes destroyed:  
those written on his hand or on scraps of 
paper, and those on the disc.  We do not know 
what sort of editing or copying was done in 
transferring the information from the first 
kind of notes to the disc.  The transcript is 
silent in this respect as none of the counsel 
asked about the process, but it is self-evident 
from an examination of the Information that it 
does not merely reflect the unedited and 
unchanged content of the sorts of notes that 
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would be written on a scrap of paper or on a 
hand. 
 
There are many uses to which the destroyed 
notes and the original content of the disc as 
well as the changes between that content and 
the content of the Information to Obtain a 
Search Warrant could have been put to by the 
defence at trial.  The credibility of [the 
officer] would be important at a trial since it 
was his sworn evidence that obtained the 
search warrant and it was the search warrant 
that uncovered the evidence to support the 
prosecution.  The information on the disc in its 
original form would be invaluable in any attack 
on the validity of the search warrant.  If 
there were inconsistencies between the notes, 
the content of the disc, the Information, or 
the constable’s evidence on a voir dire, or at 
trial, his credibility could have been 
challenged.  This is a frequent and necessary 
use of police notes and often the only 
effective way to test the credibility of a 
police witness.  The defence in this case has 
been deprived of all that. 
 
We must conclude that it was open to the trial 
judge in this case to find, as she impliedly did, 
that the destroyed notes and the disc 
contained material which the defence could 
have used even though it is difficult to specify 
the precise manner in which the information 
could have been used without knowing the 
exact content of the disc…Given the broad 
scope of the material, and its importance to 
the prosecution of the case, it was material 
that should have been available to the defence. 
[references omitted, paras. 26-29] 
 
As for the second branch, whether the officer 
failed to meet his obligation in preserving the 
evidence, Justice Sherstobitoff stated: 
 
The next question is whether [the officer] 
failed in his obligation to preserve relevant 
evidence.  In this case, the disc in question was 
deliberately destroyed in order to protect the 
identity of confidential informants.  Since the 
disc served as [the officer’s] notebook 
respecting his entire investigation of this 
matter, it amounted to destruction of his 
notebook.  Curiously, although the constable 
was examined or cross-examined by four 
separate counsel, none asked him if he was 
aware of the duty of the Crown and its 
representatives to preserve all relevant 
material for the purpose of disclosure to the 
defence, and in particular, notes of the 
investigation.  It is hard to believe that in the 
decade or so since Stinchcombe any police 
officer could be unaware of the duty to 
preserve his notes.  Nor did any counsel ask 
the officer why, in order to protect the 
identity of the informants, the content of the 
disc could not have been transcribed with 
confidential portions omitted (as was done 
with the Information to Obtain a Search 
Warrant).  Nor was he asked why it was not 
left to Crown counsel or the judge to decide 
whether or what part of the contents of the 
disc should be disclosed to the defence in 
order to comply with the rules of privilege 
respecting informants.  Since these questions 
remain unanswered, and [the officer’s] 
evidence was taken by all to be credible, we 
must assume that his motive in destroying the 
disc was his stated motive, and not an 
improper one, and that he believed that he had 
preserved the content of the disc in the 
Information to Obtain a Search Warrant.  The 
innocent motive, in the circumstances of this 
case, cannot affect the result. 
 
If the officer knew of his duty to preserve 
and produce the disc, he acted in bad faith in 
destroying it.…If he did not know of the duty 
to preserve and produce the disc, that 
amounted to inexcusable negligence… As noted 
above, it is almost inconceivable that a police 
officer could be unaware of the obligation to 
preserve material such as his notes of an 
investigation, and the disc in this case, 
constituted his notes of the investigation.  If 
he did not know of his obligation to preserve 
evidence, he should have known. [paras. 30-31] 
 
In dismissing the Crown’s appeal and holding that 
the trial judge’s granting of a stay of 
proceedings was not improper, the court held: 
 
The difficulty in this case is that the 
material in issue has been destroyed. It 
cannot be recreated.  Since it could have 
been of use to the defence, the defence has 
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been prejudiced by its loss.  Accordingly, 
both branches of the test are met.  The 
prejudice caused by the destruction will be 
manifested through the trial and its 
outcome.  Perhaps most importantly, no other 
remedy is capable of removing that prejudice. 
[para. 33] 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
STRIP SEARCH OF ‘SHORT 
TERM’ DETAINEE 
UNREASONABLE 
Ilnicki v. MacLeod, 2005 ABCA 349 
 
Two police officers attended 
the plaintiff’s residence and 
arrested him on an outstanding 
arrest warrant for no insurance. 
The officers had become aware of the arrest 
warrant while investigating another matter. The 
officers patted down the plaintiff and he later 
resisted a strip search at the police station and 
was injured when force was applied. He was 
taken to the hospital, treated for a sprain and 
then taken to the detention centre where he was 
held for about 10 minutes before seeing a 
justice of the peace. He was released on $250 
bail. 
 
The plaintiff sued and the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench judge found the defendants 
breached the plaintiff’s s.8 Charter rights and 
committed a battery in conducting the strip 
search. He was awarded $5,000 for the 
indignities of the strip search and $6,000 for 
the injury. The defendants, however, appealed to 
the Alberta Court of Appeal arguing the trial 
judge erred by finding the strip search 
unreasonable and that an unreasonable amount of 
force was used in conducting it.  
 
Unreasonable Search 
 
In R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, the Supreme 
Court of Canada recognized that the power to 
search as an incident to arrest can include a 
strip search, provided the police have reasonable 
grounds to believe it is necessary. In other 
words, merely having reasonable grounds to 
effect an arrest does not automatically carry 
with it the right to strip search. Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court outlined a distinction 
between a person held in short term detention 
from that of a person entering a prison 
population. In the latter, the Supreme Court 
noted, there was a greater need to ensure no 
weapons or illegal drugs are smuggled into the 
prison where prisoners often come into contact 
with each other. This, it was suggested, may 
justify routine strip searches of all prisoners. 
However, strip searches of short term detainees 
in police custody must be assessed on a case-by-
case basis and cannot be carried out routinely. 
 
In this case, the Alberta Court of Appeal agreed 
with the trial judge. This was a short term 
detention.  The Court stated: 
 
In the present case, the [plaintiff] was 
arrested on an outstanding warrant related to 
a traffic violation. The only purpose in taking 
him to the Detention Unit was to bring him 
before a justice of the peace so the warrant 
could be vacated and the [plaintiff] released 
on bail. The police did not intend to oppose 
bail. [The officer] testified that if a justice 
had been available when they reached the 
detention centre, no incarceration would have 
been necessary. Even if a justice had not been 
available immediately however, any possible 
incarceration would have been "short term." 
 
It follows the only reasonable expectation the 
arresting officers could have had, at the time 
they conducted the strip search, was that the 
[plaintiff] would not need to be incarcerated, 
or, if he did, it would be for a short time. This 
is borne out by the facts of this case. The 
[plaintiff] spent only about ten minutes in a 
cell before he was taken before the justice of 
the peace. He was released within 45 minutes 
of entering the detention centre. 
 
The police officers, therefore, were not 
entitled to conduct a strip search simply 
because there was a possibility the [plaintiff] 
would be detained briefly in police cells. This 
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does not mean, as the Supreme Court pointed 
out in Golden, that police officers are 
prohibited from conducting a strip search if 
other circumstances gave them a legitimate 
safety concern. But there were no such 
concerns in this case. The [plaintiff] was 
arrested at his house, in front of his wife and 
children, because of an unpaid traffic fine. 
When he was arrested, the police had no 
apparent reason to suspect he was carrying 
either weapons or drugs, and he was under 
constant surveillance thereafter. If they were 
concerned about their safety, they were 
entitled to a "pat down" or " frisk" search as 
an incident to arrest. 
 
In fact, they had carried out a pat down 
search on arrest. 
 
The only reason the police officers gave for 
later conducting the strip search, was that the 
[plaintiff] had to go before a justice of the 
peace and to do that he would have to go to 
the detention centre where he might be placed 
in a cell with other detainees. This was not 
enough to justify the strip search.[paras. 15-
19] 
 
Furthermore, it was not a reasonable inference 
that even if the plaintiff was to go to the 
detention centre that he would come into 
contact with another detainee. The officer 
testified that because this was a traffic matter 
the plaintiff would have been taken to the 
justice directly, or if not available, he would have 
been placed in a single occupancy cell at the 
detention centre. Moreover, even if it was 
necessary for the arresting officers to consider 
future contact between the plaintiff and other 
detainees, they had an obligation to consider 
ways of avoiding such contact. By minimizing the 
chance of contact the need for a strip search is 
also minimized.  
 
Two alternatives the Court suggested of avoiding 
contact were: 
 
1. the police could have contacted the detention 
centre before conducting the strip search to 
determine whether a justice was immediately 
available; 
2. the police could have contacted the detention 
centre before conducting the strip search to 
determine whether there were single 
occupancy cells available. If there were not, 
and the plaintiff would have been detained in 
the overflow with other prisoners, there were 
search facilities in the detention centre to 
conduct the strip search. 
 
Unreasonable Force 
 
As for the trial judge’s decision about the 
amount of force used in conducting the strip 
search, the Court could not say she was clearly 
wrong. The court deferred  to the trial judge’s 
decision finding the police controlled the agenda 
and could have tried other techniques to comply 
with the strip search—such as warning force 
could be used or that the plaintiff would be left 
in the search room until he complied or 
consulting with a sergeant about other ways of 
gaining compliance. 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
GROUNDS FOR ARREST 
VIEWED CUMULATIVELY, NOT 
SEPARATELY 
R. v. Bracchi, 2005 BCCA 461 
 
A police officer set up 
surveillance on a mobile home 
surrounded by a large wooden 
and chain link fence known for 
many years to be associated with 
cocaine trafficking and colloquially referred to 
as “the compound”. He would watch visitors 
attend the home (either by vehicle or on foot) 
and leave within five minutes. He stopped about 
20 vehicles he saw leave the place and seized 
cocaine from all but one. He also was inside the 
trailer on one occasion and seized an ounce of 
cocaine lying on the kitchen counter. The police 
also received other reliable information that the 
owner of the compound was trafficking in 
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cocaine and that the accused was working for 
the owner. It was also believed that the cocaine 
was packaged in sealed salmon tins.  
 
Police set up surveillance on the accused’s 
residence several times. On one occasion they 
stopped a young male who had driven up to the 
accused’s house, entered, and left a short time 
later. Police seized 0.5 grms of cocaine from the 
male who told them he bought it from the 
accused for $40. The accused then moved to 
another house and police continued periodic 
surveillance. Two weeks before his arrest, the 
accused was seen leave his house, drive 
erratically, but he lost the police following him. 
They subsequently located him at another 
trafficker’s residence and saw him pull into the 
driveway and get out of his vehicle. As the police 
drove by he turned and walked up the street. 
 
On the day of the accused’s arrest police saw 
him leave his residence in his vehicle and drive 
three blocks before turning on his lights. He 
drove in an unusual, circuitous route, rapidly 
accelerating at times. As he approached the 
compound, police stopped him, believing he was 
probably making a cocaine delivery. He was 
arrested for possession of cocaine. In an open 
fanny pack on the floor by the driver’s seat 
police found 0.5 grms. of cocaine in a clear 
plastic baggie and $1,550 in cash. Also located 
was a sealed salmon tin under the driver’s seat. 
It was opened and found to contain two plastic 
baggies of cocaine totaling 55 grms. The accused 
was then arrested for possession of cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking.  The police seized 
the cocaine and cash and continued their search, 
finding a cell phone and pager as well as a list, 
from the glove compartment, containing licence 
plates and descriptions of unmarked police 
vehicles and private vehicles belonging to police 
members. 
 
At his trial in British Columbia Provincial Court 
the accused was acquitted. The trial judge ruled 
that the arrest was unlawful because the police 
did not have reasonable grounds to effect an 
arrest. He gave no weight to the cocaine found in 
the 19 vehicles stopped leaving the compound 
and found the accused’s suspicious driving prior 
to his arrest insufficient to provide reasonable 
grounds. Since the arrest was unlawful, the 
resultant search incidental to that unlawful 
arrest was unreasonable and a violation of s.8 of 
the Charter. As a consequence, the evidence was 
excluded under s.24(2). 
 
The Crown appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing the trial judged applied 
the reasonable grounds standard incorrectly by 
evaluating each factor individually rather than 
assessing the totality of the circumstances. 
Justice Smith, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, agreed.  Rather than evaluating each 
item of evidence separately, the trial judge 
“should have determined whether the 
circumstances upon which the Crown relied as 
objective justification for the arrest, 
considered cumulatively, amounted to reasonable 
and probable grounds for the arrest.”  
 
In this case, Justice Smith ruled that the police 
did have reasonable grounds, both subjectively 
and objectively. He stated: 
 
[The officer’s] surveillance observations, his 
seizure of cocaine from the kitchen table of 
the trailer, and his discovery of cocaine on 
several occasions in vehicles leaving the 
compound were confirmatory of the 
information received by the police about drug 
trafficking generally at [the compound]. 
 
The information that the [accused] was 
involved in trafficking and was delivering 
cocaine to the compound was detailed.  It 
included names of several individuals involved 
and the specific location where the trafficking 
was allegedly taking place.  It was particular as 
to the amounts of cocaine involved and the 
novel manner of packaging the cocaine.  
Moreover, the information was provided by a 
number of sources on an ongoing basis over an 
extended period of time.  Thus, it was 
internally corroborative. One of the sources 
was an associate of the Pasanen group who 
apparently had direct knowledge of the 
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trafficking and the persons involved.  These 
factors tend to indicate that the information 
was reliable. 
 
As well, the information that the [accused] 
was involved in trafficking cocaine was 
corroborated by the seizure of cocaine by 
[the officer] from a person who had just been 
in the [accused’s] house and that person’s 
statement that he had purchased the cocaine 
from the [accused]. 
 
Further, the parallels between the [accused’s] 
conduct on the day he travelled to Cumberland 
and on the night of his arrest are striking.  On 
both occasions, he drove in a manner that 
would reasonably support a hypothesis that he 
was attempting to avoid surveillance.  His trip 
to Cumberland terminated at the home of a 
person known to the police to be a cocaine 
trafficker.  His trip on the night of his arrest 
was terminated by the police just doors away 
from the compound…known by the police to be 
a place where cocaine was trafficked.  The 
reputation of these places for drug trafficking 
is a relevant circumstance and can be taken 
into account…. Thus, there was objective 
evidence to reasonably support a hypothesis 
that the [accused] was attempting to avoid 
surveillance on the night of his arrest because 
he had cocaine in his vehicle. 
 
The actions of the [accused] from the time he 
entered his vehicle until he was stopped and 
arrested were compelling evidence, in light of 
the other evidence in possession of the police, 
that he was engaged in the commission of an 
indictable offence.  Considering all of the 
circumstances, I think a reasonable person 
could reasonably infer that the [accused] was 
probably in possession of cocaine that he was 
delivering cocaine to the compound…when the 
police stopped him and arrested him.  
[references omitted, paras. 27-31] 
 
Since the arrest was valid the search that arose 
from that arrest was also valid. The appeal was 
allowed, the acquittal quashed, and a new trial 
was ordered.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
VALID DETENTION BASED ON 
COMPELLING CUMULATIVE 
FACTORS 
R. v. Bui & Vu, 2005 BCCA 482 
 
Police in Vancouver saw the two 
accused deplane off a flight 
from Toronto. An officer knew 
they were previously involved in 
transporting contraband and 
believed Vu was Bui’s aunt.  The officer also 
knew that couriers took marihuana from 
Vancouver to Toronto, returning with tobacco 
products and money.  As the accused walked to 
the terminal, they stared at the officer 
nervously, maintained prolonged eye contact, and 
looked back at him over their shoulders. The 
accused did not talk to each other and went in 
opposite directions once in the terminal. The 
officer believed they were pretending not to 
know each other. One officer then followed Bui 
while a second officer followed Vu. 
 
Both accused were detained and it was 
determined that they had arrived from Toronto 
that day and were scheduled to return three 
days later, a short turnaround consistent with 
transporting contraband.  After learning from 
the airline that neither accused checked in 
baggage in Toronto, the investigation changed 
from tobacco contraband transport to proceeds 
of crime. The accused were moved to a 
storefront police office and told they could 
contact a lawyer, but they were not formally 
advised of their s.10(b) Charter rights. They 
both indicated a desire to speak to a lawyer.  
 
Vu was taken to a small office and read her 
s.10(b) rights from a card. As she stood up, her 
jacket fell open and a currency shaped package 
was seen protruding from an inside pocket, while 
a contoured lumpiness around her waist was also 
observed. She was arrested, searched, and 
$83,500 was found. Bui was also taken to an 
office and again advised he was being detained 
for possession of proceeds of crime and properly 
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BC’s PROPSER WARNING 
You have the right to a reasonable
opportunity to contact counsel.  I am
obliged not to take a statement from
you or  to ask you to participate in any
process which could provide
incriminating evidence until you are
certain about whether you wish to
exercise that right. Do you
understand? What do you wish to do? 
advised of his s.10(b) rights. Outlines of two 
thick bundles could be seen in his pockets. The 
officer learned what was found on Vu and then 
arrested Bui. He was searched and police found  
$13,360 on his person and many open, vacuum-
sealed plastic bags containing marihuana flakes in 
his carry-on bag. Both accused were given access 
to a lawyer at the main police station about an 
hour after the detentions began because they 
could not be afforded privacy at the storefront 
office. 
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
trial judge concluded that both accused were 
validly detained by police because the detentions 
were based on articulable cause. Since the 
detentions were based on a constellation of 
objectively discernible facts, they were not 
arbitrary and therefore did not violate s.9 of 
the Charter. The money was seen during a lawful 
detention and confirmed during a search 
incidental to lawful arrest. As for the delay in 
accessing counsel, the trial judge ruled that the 
police should have given the accused the option 
of calling a lawyer without privacy. This violated 
the accused’s s.10(b) Charter rights, but the 
evidence was admissible under s.24(2). They 
were convicted of proceeds of crime offences. 
 
The accused then both appealed to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that 
the trial judge erred in finding the police had 
reasonable grounds to detain them. Since the 
detention violated s.9 of the Charter, it was 
submitted, the search and money seizure 
violated s.8 and should be excluded from 
evidence under s.24(2). However, Justice Low, 
authoring the unanimous decision, found the trial 
judge did not err. The cumulative effect of the 
factors considered by the trial judge were 
compelling. As for the trial judge’s s.24(2) 
Charter analysis and the effect of the s.10(b) 
breach on the admission of evidence, there was 
no error. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
DETAINEE MUST BE DILIGENT 
OR POLICE MAY PROCEED 
WITH BREATH TESTS 
R. v. Jones, 2005 ABCA 289 
 
The accused was arrested for 
impaired driving, advised of his 
right to counsel, and read the 
demand for breath samples. He 
said he wanted to speak to 
counsel of his choice. At the police station the 
accused was taken to a private phone room 
containing a phone, phone books, and a list of 
lawyers. He was told to knock on the door when 
he was done and seven minutes later he did just 
that. The officer entered the room and asked 
whether the accused had contacted counsel. The 
accused said he had not contacted his lawyer so 
the officer again told him about legal aid and the 
phone book and that he could call another lawyer. 
The accused said he only wanted to talk to 
counsel of his choice. He did not say he wanted 
more time or that he required any assistance. He 
was escorted to the breathalyser room and 
provided samples of his breath. 
 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the judge 
found the accused was provided with a 
reasonable opportunity to consult counsel, which 
he was not reasonably diligent in exercising. The 
breathalyser certificate was admitted and the 
accused was convicted of over 80mg%. The 
accused appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench, but his appeal was dismissed. He 
then appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing his right to counsel under s.10(b) of the 
Charter had been violated because the police 
should have asked 
him why he was not 
able to reach a 
lawyer, should have 
read a further 
caution (Prosper 
warning) or at least 
asked him if he 
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needed more time, and should not have 
suggested contacting other counsel. 
 
In dismissing the appeal, Justices McFayden and 
Ritter first summarized the duties on the police 
with respect to s.10(b) of the Charter. They 
wrote: 
 
Section 10(b) of the Charter imposes two 
duties on police officers. They must inform 
the detainee of his right to consult counsel 
without delay and of the existence and 
availability of legal aid and duty counsel. If the 
detained person wishes to consult counsel, the 
police must provide a reasonable opportunity 
for the detained person to exercise that 
right, and refrain from eliciting evidence until 
he or she has had that opportunity. Where the 
trial judge concludes that a reasonable 
opportunity has been provided, the trial judge 
must consider whether the detained person 
was reasonably diligent in exercising that 
opportunity. The burden is on the detainee to 
establish reasonable diligence. If the detainee 
is unable to reach counsel after reasonably 
diligent efforts, then the issue of waiver will 
arise and a Prosper warning may be required. 
[para. 8] 
 
In finding the police complied with their 
responsibilities under s.10(b), the majority held: 
 
Here, the police officer carried out the duties 
imposed on him. He did not interrupt the 
[accused] in his efforts to reach counsel, nor 
did he do anything that interfered with the 
[accused’s] exercise of his right to consult his 
lawyer. It was the [accused] who terminated 
his efforts by knocking on the door, which 
signified that he had finished with the phone 
room. The only evidence establishes that the 
[accused] could have remained in the phone 
room had he required further time to contact 
his lawyer. He did not suggest that he needed 
more time, nor did he ask the police officer to 
assist him in reaching his counsel. 
 
Counsel for the [accused] suggests that the 
police officer should have questioned the 
[accused] regarding the reasons for his 
inability to reach counsel. We do not agree. 
Such questioning could be viewed as an 
interference with the [accused’s] right to 
privacy in his consultation with counsel. 
 
The [accused] also suggests that the police 
officer should have asked him whether he 
required further time. However, the police 
officer had not interrupted the [accused] nor 
had he suggested to him that his time was up. 
On the only evidence, the [accused] knocked 
on the door because he had terminated his 
efforts and was ready to proceed to the next 
step. The police officer reasonably concluded 
from the [accused’s] actions that the 
[accused] had terminated his efforts to try to 
call his own lawyer. In the circumstances, an 
inquiry about whether the [accused] needed 
more time would have been redundant. As he 
knew that the [accused] had been unable to 
reach his own lawyer, the police officer 
reminded the [accused] that he could seek the 
assistance of legal aid counsel or other 
counsel. The [accused] responded that he did 
not wish to do so. We do not agree with the 
suggestion of counsel for the [accused] that 
the police officer’s attempt to provide 
additional information to the [accused] 
constituted an improper interference with the 
[accused’s] right to consult counsel of his own 
choice. 
 
The [accused] also suggests that an additional 
Prosper warning should have been read to the 
[accused]. That warning may be required 
where the detained person, who has been 
reasonably diligent in exercising his right but 
has not been successful, subsequently wishes 
to waive his right to counsel. It is not 
applicable here. [references omitted, paras. 9-
12] 
 
Justice Berger, however, disagreed with his 
colleagues. He noted there were two ways a 
person can waive their right to counsel after 
asserting it: 
 
1) by unequivocal waiver (clear and 
unambiguous language) 
 
2) by failing to reasonably pursue the right 
to counsel 
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In this case, Justice Berger opined that the 
police did not provide the accused with a 
reasonable opportunity to contact counsel. They 
should have clarified the situation before 
presenting the accused to the breathalyser. He 
stated: 
 
There is…no evidence in the record 
establishing that the [accused] accepted the 
constable’s edict that a knock on the door 
signalled the termination of his efforts to 
contact his lawyer of choice. The unilateral 
imposition of a presumption of waiver cannot, 
in my opinion, operate to deprive an accused of 
his right to counsel by equating a knock on the 
door with waiver of the right. The Charter 
threshold for clear and unequivocal waiver 
cannot be displaced by an ambiguous 
benchmark imposed by the police. After all, a 
knock on the door by a detainee locked in a 
telephone room is capable of supporting any 
number of alternative explanations.  
 
When asked whether he wanted to contact 
another lawyer, the [accused] re-stated his 
desire to consult only with [his lawyer]. This 
was a reassertion of his continuing intent to 
contact his lawyer of choice. The Crown failed 
to discharge its burden that the [accused] had 
given “a clear indication that he had changed 
his mind” and had waived his right to counsel. 
The test for waiver…is not made out. It was, in 
my opinion, unreasonable for the police to 
proceed as if the [accused] (after only seven 
minutes in the phone room) had waived his 
right to counsel.  
… … … 
In the case at bar, the Crown takes the view 
that the informational duty to read a “Prosper 
warning” only arises where the accused person 
no longer wishes to seek the advice of counsel. 
The Crown submits that “[a] detainee who has 
given no indication that he wishes to waive his 
right to counsel [i.e. the [accused]] should not 
be read a waiver warning as if he had.”…This 
proposition, in my view, must be rejected. If 
an informational duty arises after an accused 
has sought legal advice and then has changed 
his mind (Prosper), why would it not arise in 
circumstances where the accused has been 
duly diligent in exercising the right to counsel 
of choice and continues to assert his right…? 
When first efforts fail, it seems to me 
anomalous that in the absence of an express 
abandonment of the desire to contact counsel 
of choice, the police would be at liberty to 
proceed with their investigation without taking 
steps to ensure that the accused has genuinely 
waived his right to counsel. In the instant 
case, the police failed to take such steps. 
 
The Charter protects the least knowledgeable 
accused. The contention of the… Crown that 
the [accused] was obliged to assert “I want to 
try again” is, I suggest, a recipe for a two-
tiered right to counsel. A knowledgeable 
accused might well assert “I want to try 
again”. A less sophisticated detainee might 
not. That is precisely why, in my opinion, an 
informational duty is properly imposed on the 
police in the circumstances of this case. 
[references omitted, paras. 22-26] 
  
Justice Berger would have allowed the appeal, 
quashed the conviction, and entered an 
acquittal.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
NO GUILTY INFERENCE FROM 
EXERCISING RIGHT TO 
SILENCE 
R. v. Turcotte, 2005 SCC 50 
 
The accused attended a police 
detachment and repeatedly 
asked the clerk to send a police 
car to the ranch where he lived. 
Two police officers took over 
from the clerk and the accused again repeatedly 
asked that a police car be sent to the ranch, but 
would not explain why. He then gave a set of 
keys to the police and said they were for a truck 
parked outside that had a rifle in it. The accused 
was taken to an interview room where he 
provided his name and date of birth when asked, 
and again made repeated requests that a police 
car be sent to the ranch, but refused to explain 
why. After police arrived at the ranch they 
found three victims that had died from axe 
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wounds to the head. The accused was then 
detained and advised of his rights and was later 
arrested for the murders.  
 
At trial in the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia the Crown characterized the accused’s 
silence (refusal to answer questions) at the 
police detachment as “consciousness of guilt.” 
The trial judge told the jury that the accused’s 
refusal to tell the police what was at the ranch 
was better characterized as “post-offence 
conduct” (behaviour after the crime), which 
could, if the jury decided, provide evidence of 
guilt. The accused was found guilty on three 
counts of second degree murder and sentenced 
to life in prison.  
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal and his convictions were set 
aside and a new trial was ordered. The unanimous 
three member court ruled that the accused’s 
silence was irrelevant and could not constitute 
evidence that he committed the offences.  
Because there was no common law or statutory 
rule requiring the accused to answer police 
questions, he had the right to remain silent.  
 
The Crown appealed the decision of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Canada arguing that the accused’s refusal to 
answer some of the police questions could be 
relied upon as post-offence conduct from which 
an inference of quilt could be drawn.  Justice 
Abella, authoring the unanimous nine member 
judgment, first examined the meaning of “post-
offence conduct.” She noted that it is not a 
neutral term encompassing all behaviour by an 
accused following the commission of a crime, but 
rather only conduct probative of guilt, such as 
flight from the scene of a crime, attempts to 
resist arrest, failure to appear for trial, acts of 
concealment like lying, assuming a false name, 
changing appearance, or hiding or disposing of 
evidence.   
 
In this case, the accused had the right to refuse 
to answer police questions. “Absent statutory 
compulsion, everyone has the right to be silent in 
the face of police questioning,” said Justice 
Abella. “It would be an illusory right if the 
decision not to speak to the police could be used 
by the Crown as evidence of guilt.” She further 
stated: 
 
Conduct after a crime has been committed is 
only admissible as “post-offence conduct” 
when it provides circumstantial evidence of 
guilt.  The necessary relevance is lost if there 
is no connection between the conduct and 
guilt.  The law imposes no duty to speak to or 
cooperate with the police.  This fact alone 
severs any link between silence and guilt.  
Silence in the face of police questioning will, 
therefore, rarely be admissible as post-
offence conduct because it is rarely 
probative of guilt.  Refusing to do what one 
has a right to refuse to do reveals nothing.  
An inference of guilt cannot logically or 
morally emerge from the exercise of a 
protected right.  Using silence as evidence of 
guilt artificially creates a duty, despite a 
right to the contrary, to answer all police 
questions. 
 
Since there was no duty on [the accused’s] 
part to speak to the police, his failure to do 
so was irrelevant; because it was irrelevant, 
no rational conclusion about guilt or innocence 
can be drawn from it; and because it was not 
probative of guilt, it could not be 
characterized for the jury as “post-offence 
conduct”. [paras. 55-56] 
 
The Crown also argued that the right to silence 
is only engaged when the accused is under the 
power of the state (such as detention or arrest), 
and if not, the right has no relevance. In 
rejecting this submission, Justice Abella wrote: 
 
In general, absent a statutory requirement to 
the contrary, individuals have the right to 
choose whether to speak to the police, even if 
they are not detained or arrested.  The 
common law right to silence exists at all 
times  against the state, whether or not the 
person asserting it is within its power or 
control.  Like the confessions rule, an 
accused’s right to silence applies any time he 
or she interacts with a person in authority, 
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whether detained or not.  It is a right 
premised on an individual’s freedom to choose 
the extent of his or her cooperation with the 
police, and is animated by a recognition of the 
potentially coercive impact of the state’s 
authority and a concern that individuals not 
be required to incriminate themselves.  These 
policy considerations exist both before and 
after arrest or detention.  There is, as a 
result, no principled basis for failing to 
extend the common law right to silence to 
both periods.  
 
Nor do I share the Crown’s view that by 
attending at the detachment and answering 
some of the police’s questions, [the accused] 
waived any right he might otherwise have 
had.  A willingness to impart some information 
to the police does not completely submerge an 
individual’s right not to respond to police 
questioning.  He or she need not be mute to 
reflect an intention to invoke it.  An individual 
can provide some, none, or all of the 
information he or she has.  A voluntary 
interaction with the police, even one initiated 
by an individual, does not constitute a waiver 
of the right to silence.  The right to choose 
whether to speak is retained throughout the 
interaction. [paras. 51-52] 
 
The accused’s behaviour at the police 
detachment, albeit not admissible as post 
offence conduct, was nonetheless admissible as 
an inextricable part of the narrative. However, 
the trial judge was required to tell the jury that 
it could not be used to support an inference of 
guilt. This failure by the trial judge was highly 
prejudicial and a significant error. The appeal 
ordering a new trial was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
LET IT FLOW, LET IT FLOW, 
LET IT FLOW 
R. v. Atlas, 2005 BCPC 0456 
 
Police attended an apartment 
building composed of privately 
owned suites after receiving a 
complaint from an occupant that 
a noise was heard and there was now a water 
leak. The police spoke with the occupant and 
determined that the noise and water leak, 
evidenced by seeping water through the ceiling, 
had come from the suite above the complainant. 
The officers attended to the floor above and 
located the suite where a significant amount of 
water could be seen coming from under the door 
of the unit. The police knocked but received no 
reply. As the caretaker tried to open the door 
with the master key a voice was heard from 
inside state, “There is nothing wrong here, go 
away.” Given the circumstances, the officer was 
concerned with public safety and that someone 
could be harmed inside the suite. Wanting to see 
what was going on; the police entered and 
searched all the rooms in the suite. 
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court the trial judge concluded the police were 
not entitled to make the warrantless entry. 
Although the police officer acted in good faith, 
the entry and search was a serious s.8 Charter 
breach. In holding the entry unreasonable, 
Justice Galati stated: 
 
In my view, these circumstances do not 
justify a warrantless entry of a private 
residence, particularly where the occupant 
has denied entry, as the occupant here, or 
one of the occupants here did.  I accept that 
[the officer] believed that he should enter to 
see what was going on, but there was no 
sufficient objective basis to support a 
concern for public safety.  The escape of 
water from an apartment might be nothing 
more than a plumbing problem.  The police 
cannot enter a private dwelling where there's 
no sufficient objective reason to believe that 
entry is necessary to protect the safety of 
the public, which in most cases, in my view, 
will not include circumstances where there is 
potential for damage to property. [para. 6] 
 
The evidence (which was not identified in the 
judgment) was inadmissible in the undisclosed 
charges.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
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 GROUNDS FOR IMPAIRMENT 
‘BLINDINGLY OBVIOUS’ 
R. v. Bounds, 2005 BCPC 
 
A police officer approached the 
driver of a vehicle that rear-
ended a stopped police car in a 
very well-marked Counterattack 
roadblock program. The driver 
appeared unable to place her vehicle into park 
and when the police officer spoke with her, 
there was a strong smell of liquor on her breath 
and her speech was slurred. At this point the 
officer formed the opinion that the driver was 
impaired by alcohol.  
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued, in part, that the officer did not 
have reasonable and probable grounds upon which 
to form an opinion the accused committed an 
offence. Justice Antifaev, however, disagreed. 
She said: 
 
Defence counsel says that that constellation 
of factors is insufficient on which to base the 
making of a breathalyzer demand, and I have 
to respectfully disagree with that submission.  
In my view, any reasonable person faced with 
that constellation of factors would leap to 
what is surely a blindingly obvious conclusion in 
the circumstances, based on those factors 
alone, without more, that this is a driver who 
has been drinking way too much alcohol to be 
driving. 
 
I am putting it in a very colloquial manner here, 
but it is quite clear, I think, that, in my view, 
even based on the limited number of factors 
that the officer initially committed herself 
to…she certainly did, in my view, have not only 
a subjective belief, but there were objectively 
present enough factors to support the making 
of a demand.  I am satisfied that she did have 
reasonable and probable grounds to make the 
demand. [paras. 6-7] 
 
The breathalyzer certificate was therefore 
admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
SEARCH OF OUTBUILDING 
PROPER AS INCIDENTAL TO 
ARREST 
R. v. Johnson, 2005 BCPC 0432 
 
The police applied for and were 
granted a tele-warrant to 
search a house for a marihuana 
grow operation. The initial 
application requested a search 
of both the residence and an outbuilding. 
However, the justice crossed out any 
authorization to search the outbuilding. The 
warrant was executed and police found a 
marihuana grow operation in the house and a 
loaded SKS semi-automatic rifle in a bedroom. 
The accused and another occupant were 
cooperative. The police then attended to the 
outbuilding and heard a television or radio noise 
inside. For officer safety reasons, given the rifle 
found at the house, officers wanted to search 
the outbuilding to see if anyone was inside. The 
police entered and found no one inside, but did 
discover a psilocybin grow operation. The 
accused was charged with offences relating to 
growing marihuana and psilocybin.  
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court the accused argued, in part, that the 
police violated his s.8 Charter right by searching 
the outbuilding when the warrant did not 
authorize its search. Although warrantless 
searches are presumptively unreasonable and a 
violation of s.8, a search properly conducted as 
an incident to lawful arrest is an exception to 
the presumption. As Justice Smith noted, “the 
police had no right to enter the outbuilding 
unless there was a legitimate need to enter it 
for officer safety reasons incidental to the 
arrest of the accused at the residence.” In 
finding the search in this case justified, the 
court stated: 
 
The search warrant was clear that it did not 
authorize entry into the outbuilding.  Were 
exigent circumstances present for officer 
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safety once the loaded gun was found in the 
residence, given the radio was still playing in 
the outbuilding? …In the case at bar the out 
building was fairly close to the residence.  I 
find that the locating of the loaded semi-
automatic rifle in the residence, coupled with 
the continued playing of the radio in the 
outbuilding, did create exigent circumstances 
for the need to sweep the out building for 
officer safety.  I find that the sweep of the 
outbuilding was a lawful search incident to the 
arrest of the accused and not in breach of his 
section 8 Charter rights. [para. 22] 
 
The evidence was admissible.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
PRE-CHARGE CONDUCT 
ADMISSIBLE IN CRIMINAL 
HARASSMENT CASE 
R. v. D.D.,  
(2005) Docket: C41160 (OntCA) 
 
The accused called the victim, 
with whom he had had a short 
relationship eight years earlier 
that produced a daughter, and 
yelled at her because her new boyfriend was 
parked in the victim’s driveway. He also told the 
victim he wanted to take their daughter to 
school but this request was refused. The 
telephone call ended and the accused 
subsequently appeared on the victim’s doorstep. 
The victim went outside and met the accused. 
The accused complained of the victim having sex 
with her boyfriend while their daughter was in 
the house, yelled at the victim while an inch from 
her face, refused to leave and banged on the 
door demanding the boyfriend come outside. The 
victim pushed the accused away from the door so 
she could get back inside the house and the 
daughter called 911, but the accused left. 
 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
on a charge of criminal harassment, the Crown 
tried to enter evidence of six prior incidents to 
help prove the following elements of the 
offence: 
 
• whether the accused’s conduct caused the 
victim to fear for her safety; 
 
• whether the accused was aware or reckless as 
to the fear his conduct may have caused; and 
 
• whether the victim’s fear was objectively 
justified.  
 
The trial judge considered each of the six prior 
incidents independently and ruled them 
inadmissible because the prejudicial effect in 
allowing the evidence of bad character 
outweighed its probative value. The Crown 
submitted that an acquittal be entered since the 
evidence of the most recent incident, by itself, 
would not prove a charge of criminal harassment. 
An acquittal was entered, but the Crown then 
appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal  arguing 
the evidence of the prior incidents was not 
submitted to demonstrate propensity, but rather 
to show the effect of the accused’s behaviour on 
the victim during this most recent incident and 
whether the accused had an awareness 
(knowledge or reckless inadvertence) that the 
victim was afraid of him.  
 
Justice MacFarland, authoring the unanimous 
appeal court judgment, agreed with the Crown. 
Pre-charge conduct in cases of criminal 
harassment is admissible for the purposes of 
determining whether the victim feared for their 
safety and whether that fear was reasonable 
(objectively justifiable) in all of the 
circumstances.  Furthermore, pre-charge 
conduct is also useful in assessing whether the 
accused knew that his conduct would cause fear 
or whether he was reckless as to whether or not 
the victim was fearful. As a result, the court 
ruled that the trial just misapprehended the 
probative value of the evidence and a new trial 
was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
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PAT DOWN SEARCH OF 
DETAINEE REASONABLE 
R. v. B.A.D.G., 2005 BCPC 0504 
 
Shortly after midnight police 
responded to a reported 
residential break and enter 
involving four masked men with a 
baseball bat. The suspects were described as 
very wet, dark skinned, Indo-Canadian males in 
their twenties, one over six feet tall, who fled 
down a back lane. Police set up containment and 
two young males were seen coming out of a dark 
lane about seven blocks from the break and 
enter. Both males were soaking wet, one was over 
six feet, and one was pushing a bicycle. The 
officer identified himself and told the men that 
they were under investigation for a break and 
enter in the area.  
 
Other officers arrived and the accused, wearing 
a puffy vest and bandana around his neck, was to 
be pat frisked for safety reasons. He was asked 
whether he had anything sharp. He said he had a 
knife and began to move his hand toward the 
back of his waist. An officer said no, grabbed 
the accused’s waist, and handcuffed him. The 
officer then patted the accused’s waist down 
and found a knife tucked into his trousers under 
his vest.  After a further pat down the officer 
felt something hard in the accused’s vest pocket. 
This item was removed and found to be keys to 
the residence which was broken into. The 
accused’s bandana was also seized because it was 
similar to the description of the masks used by 
the suspects. Minutes after the stop the 
accused was arrested for carrying a concealed 
weapon and given his s.10(b) Charter rights.  
 
At his trial in British Columbia Provincial Court 
on charges of carrying a concealed weapon, break 
and enter, theft, and possession of stolen 
property, the accused argued that he was 
arbitrarily detained, unreasonably searched, not 
properly advised of his rights, and that the 
evidence should be excluded under s.24(2) of the 
Charter. The Crown, on the other hand, 
submitted that there were no Charter breaches 
and that even if there were, the evidence was 
nonetheless admissible under s.24(2).  
 
Judge Ehrcke concluded that the test for 
investigative detention had been satisfied. She 
stated: 
 
Both officers has reasonable grounds to 
suspect the accused was connected to the 
break and enter and that his detention was 
necessary.  It was late at night, the two males 
stopped were young, they were soaking wet, 
they had come from a laneway seven blocks 
from the residence, there was no one else 
around, and it was not long after the police 
dispatch had been broadcast.  Although [the 
officer] testified that she would have stopped 
anyone in the area remotely matching the 
description of the perpetrators, this 
detention must be evaluated on its own merits. 
 
[The officer] had reasonable grounds to 
conduct a protective pat down search, based 
on the circumstances.  Again, it was late at 
night.  The alleged offence was serious – it 
involved entering an occupied home.  The police 
information was that the perpetrators were 
masked.  Unlike in Mann, the object in the 
accused’s pocket was hard, not soft.  The 
officer was entitled to check it, especially 
after she knew the accused had a concealed 
knife. 
 
Another factor in this case is that once the 
[the officer] found the knife, she had grounds 
to arrest the accused.  She did not do this 
immediately, but it would have justified a 
search incident to arrest. 
 
The manner of search was reasonable.  It was 
a pat down search only. 
 
The seizure of the bandana was justified.  By 
the time this was done, the officer had 
information that it was similar to the masks 
worn by the perpetrators. [paras. 26-30] 
 
There were no Charter violations and the 
evidence was admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourts.bc.ca 
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FLIGHT FROM POLICE 
REQUIRES CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCE 
R. v. Prymak, 2005 ABCA 377 
 
The 27 year old accused was 
convicted of dangerous driving 
and flight from police after he 
led police on a 43 minute high 
speed chase on country roads, through a village 
and along a highway. He drove at speeds as high 
as 155 km/h, failed to stop at stop signs, drove 
the wrong way down a one way street, swerved 
on the roadway, and encountered other vehicles 
and pedestrians along the way. Once he was 
boxed in by pursuing police units the accused and 
his passenger fled on foot. The car had many 
empty and full beer cans inside and the accused 
admitted that he had been drinking. 
 
He had a dated criminal record (driving over 80 
mg% x 2) and five speeding convictions on his 
driving record. He was sentenced to 90 days in 
jail, placed on probation for two years, and given 
a two year driving prohibition. At sentencing the 
judge questioned the decision of the police to 
chase the accused and found this to reduce his 
moral blameworthiness, a mitigating factor in 
sentencing.  
 
The Crown appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing the sentencing judge made a 
number of mistakes and the sentence handed 
down was demonstrably unfit. Citing an earlier 
Alberta Court of Appeal decision (R. v. Roberts, 
2005 ABCA 11), Justice Picard noted: 
 
Parliament intended the flight crime to be 
dealt with as a serious, aggravated criminal 
offence. It is an offence potentially very 
dangerous to the public, the moral turpitude is 
great, and there can be no deterrence unless 
the penalties equal or exceed those for the 
pre-existing offence whose detection or 
prosecution is being fled. Deterrence and 
denunciation are paramount considerations in 
sentencing for this crime. [para. 7] 
 
Furthermore, Roberts requires that a 
consecutive sentence be imposed for flight from 
police. In this case, the aggravating factors were 
many; driving after drinking alcohol, the offence 
was potentially very dangerous, and the moral 
turpitude was great. The sentencing judge also 
erred in reducing the accused’s moral 
blameworthiness because the police decided to 
chase. On the other hand, the mitigating 
circumstances included the accused’s age, family 
support, a good employment record, and a young 
family he was responsible for supporting. 
 
The 90 day sentence imposed did not give 
sufficient weight to denunciation and 
deterrence. Therefore, the appeal was allowed 
and the accused was sentenced to six months 
incarceration for dangerous driving and six 
months incarceration for the flight consecutive. 
Applying the globality principle an overall 
sentence of nine months was imposed.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
FINGERPRINT NOT ENOUGH 
R. v. Yonkman, 2005 BCCA 561 
 
After breaking into a home the 
suspects fled in a Jeep that was 
first pursued by a neighbour, 
then by police. The police chase 
was called off and the vehicle 
was later found abandoned less than two hours 
after the break-in. Three sets of fingerprints 
were found on the vehicle, including the 
accused’s thumb and palm print on a rear view 
mirror located on the passenger’s side floor. As 
well, the broad description of the vehicle’s 
driver as seen by the pursuing officers was not 
inconsistent with the accused’s appearance. 
 
The accused was convicted in British Columbia 
Provincial Court of break and enter. The judge 
was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused’s presence at the break-in was 
established by his fingerprints found on the 
mirror. The accused appealed his conviction to 
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the British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing the 
judge’s verdict was unreasonable because the 
evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt he was present when the crime was 
committed.  
 
Justice Lowry, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, agreed. He wrote: 
 
The judge gave no explanation as to why the 
presence of [the accused’s] fingerprints on 
the mirror proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he was at the residence when the break-
in occurred.  If, as I understand, it is 
accepted that the mirror was the mirror that 
was missing from the windshield mount in the 
Jeep, [the accused’s] fingerprints on it 
proved that [the accused] had been in the 
Jeep at some time.  But the question is 
whether the evidence proves to the standard 
required in a criminal case that [the accused] 
was in the Jeep at the time it was at the 
residence.  It appears to me the judge did 
not focus on the distinction. 
 
This being a purely circumstantial case, the 
conviction can be sound only if it was open to 
the judge to conclude, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the evidence as a whole was 
consistent with [the accused] being in the 
Jeep at the residence and inconsistent with 
any other rational conclusion…  This Court has 
recognized that, in a case of this kind, 
fingerprint evidence may be sufficient to 
support a conviction, but the court must be 
satisfied on the evidence as a whole that the 
fingerprint was not left by the accused where 
it was found at some time other than when 
the crime was committed… There must be a 
temporal connection between the fingerprint 
being left and the commission of the crime. 
 
The frailty in the Crown’s case is the lack of 
any evidence that would establish that [the 
accused’s] fingerprint on the mirror was left 
there when the Jeep was being driven to or 
from the residence as opposed to some 
earlier time.  The Crown did not establish how 
long [the accused] had access to the Jeep.  
Apart from the fact that the ignition 
appeared to have been tampered with, there 
was no evidence as to whether the Jeep had 
been stolen, and, more particularly, if it had, 
when that had occurred.  There is on the 
evidence then no reason why [the accused’s] 
fingerprint could not have been left on the 
mirror days, weeks, or months before the 
crime was committed. [references omitted, 
paras. 8-10] 
 
And further: 
 
There was a complete lack of evidence to 
support the temporal connection necessary to 
inferring that, because [the accused’s] 
fingerprints were found on the mirror, he was 
in the Jeep when it travelled to and from the 
residence where the crime was committed. 
[para. 14] 
 
The appeal was allowed and the conviction was 
set aside. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ACTUAL ADVANTAGE NOT 
NECESSARY FOR 
PERSONATION 
R. v. Boyle, 2005 BCCA 537 
 
The accused acquired a birth 
certificate in the name of a 
deceased person and then 
applied for and obtained a social 
insurance number and BC Identification card. 
He then used these documents to acquire a BC 
learner’s driver’s licence in the deceased’s name. 
He also opened a bank account and postal box. 
At trial on a charge of personation under 
s.403(a) of the Criminal Code the accused’s 
criminal and driving records were entered as 
evidence to show proof of motive.  
 
Section 403(a) states that a person commits an 
indictable offence “who fraudulently personates 
any person, living or dead, (a) with intent to gain 
advantage for himself or another person.” He 
was convicted when the trial judge found that it 
did not matter than it was not proved that he 
utilized the false identity to further a crime. In 
the trial judge’s view the accused fraudulently 
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obtained the “false identity to make his past 
disappear and he thereby gained advantage.” 
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the Crown 
did not prove he used his false identity to gain 
any advantage that he could not have obtained 
under his own name. Justice Hall, authoring the 
judgment for the unanimous court, disagreed. 
He stated: 
 
I am of the view that, if anything, the 
approach of the trial judge in this case was 
more favourable to the [accused] than was 
warranted.  The trial judge held that the 
[accused] had gained an advantage by being 
able to adopt a new identity.  However, it was 
only required for a conviction to be 
registered that the judge find that the 
[accused] had the intent to gain an advantage 
by personating someone else.  The judge's 
finding that the [accused] gained an 
advantage seems to me to be a clear 
indication that the judge was of the opinion 
that the [accused] had the necessary intent 
mandated by the section of the Criminal 
Code, namely having an intent to obtain an 
advantage by adopting the false identity of 
the deceased person….  It seems to me that 
the obtaining here of a new identity was in 
and of itself an advantage.  While it is true 
that the learner's licence [the accused] 
obtained had restrictions on it that his own 
licence did not have, it was certainly an 
inference open to the judge that the 
[accused] intended to obtain a licence 
document that would enable him to pass 
himself off as someone without a prior driving 
record.  Likewise, the obtaining of this 
document plus the other documentation, the 
social insurance number and the 
B.C. identification card, opened up a panorama 
of possibilities to the [accused], a panorama 
untrammelled by the existence of the 
criminal or driving record in his name.  As the 
judge observed, it would be a way of “making 
his past disappear. 
 
It is true that the [accused] did not obtain 
any money, nor did he avoid arrest by using 
the identification he had obtained in the 
name of [the deceased] …but as I said, in my 
opinion the judge made no error in finding 
that, based on his actions and his history 
(which could furnish a motive), the Crown had 
proven on all the evidence that the [accused] 
had demonstrated the necessary intent to 
gain by personation an advantage for himself, 
the very thing prohibited by the statute.  The 
fact that he came to the attention of the 
authorities before he was able to obtain any 
particular monetary or other advantage does 
not afford a defence to the charge of which 
he was convicted. [references omitted, paras. 
8-9] 
 
The accused’s appeal from conviction was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
BC’s Top 25 Stolen Vehicles 
Rank Make Model Years at most risk 
1 Chrysler  Voyager/Caravan    92, 93, 94, 95 
2 Honda Civic                     92, 93, 95, 98, 00 
3 Chrysler Neon                    95, 96, 98, 00 
4 Honda Accord                  88, 90-92, 94 
5 Toyota Camry                  87-90 
6 Jeep Cherokee             89, 93-95 
7 Nissan Pathfinder             91, 92, 93, 95 
8 Ford F350                     00, 01, 02, 03, 04 
9 Chrysler Intrepid                 94, 95, 96, 99, 00 
10 Dodge Dakota                  91, 92, 93, 94, 00 
11 Acura Integra                  90, 91, 94, 95 
12 Plymouth Acclaim                90, 91, 92 
13 Chrysler Dynasty                90, 91, 92 
14 Nissan 240SX                  89, 90, 92 
15 Plymouth Sundance             91, 92, 93 
16 Honda Prelude                 86, 88 
17 Nissan  Sentra                  90, 91, 92 
18 Ford  Mustang               88, 89, 90 
19 Toyota 4Runner               88, 89 
20 Ford Explorer                91, 94, 97 
21 Dodge Shadow                91, 92 
22 Chevrolet Cavalier                89, 90 
23 Chrysler LeBaron               90, 91 
24 Nissan Pulsar                   87, 88 
25 Oldsmobile  Cutlass                 90, 91 
Source: www.icbc.com [accessed November 29, 2005) This list records 
the make and model of vehicles stolen in British Columbia from January 1 
to December 31, 2004 
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2006 POLICE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE 
APRIL 10-12, 2006 
Coming soon!!! The British 
Columbia Association of Chief's 
of Police, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General 
and the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia will be hosting 
the "Police Leadership 2006 Conference" April 
10 to 12, 2006 at the Westin Bayshore in 
Vancouver, British Columbia. This is Canada’s 
largest Police Leadership Conference and was 
sold out in 2004 with more than 600 delegates 
attending.  
 
Leadership in policing is not bound by position or 
rank and this conference will provide delegates 
from the police community with an opportunity to 
explore a variety of leadership areas. Police 
Leadership 2006 will bring together experts who 
will provide current, lively, and interesting topics 
on leadership. This carefully chosen list of 
speakers will provide a first class opportunity at 
a first class venue to hear some of the world’s 
outstanding authorities on leadership. 
Therefore, early registration is encouraged so 
you do not miss out on this great opportunity. 
 
Beautiful downtown Vancouver will provide the 
backdrop for the Police Leadership 2006 
Conference. The host hotel, the Westin 
Bayshore Resort and Marina, offers state of the 
art facilities, excellent accommodation rates, 
and promises to be an enjoyable venue for the 
conference. The Westin is located on the shores 
of Coal Harbour, overlooking Stanley Park, and is 
a short walk to the 
downtown’s business 
district, shopping, 
and entertainment. 
Or you may choose 
to jog, bike, or roller blade along Vancouver’s 
famous Seawall. 
 
 
To date, Police Leadership 2006 has confirmed 
the following presenters: 
 
Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire 
O.C., C.M.M., M.S.C., C.D. (Retired) 
 
Stephen Covey  
Author, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People 
 
Richard Boyatzis 
Author, Primal Leadership 
 
Rick Dinse  
Chief of Police, Salt Lake City Police Department  
 
John King  
Assistant Chief of Police, Montgomery County 
Department of Police 
 
Eddie Compass 
Former Chief of Police, New Orleans Police 
Department  
 
Conference Registration 
 
The registration fee for the Police Leadership 
2006 Conference is $385 CDN (plus GST) if you 
register before March 5, 2006. The conference 
fee for registrations received AFTER March 5, 
2006 will be $425 CDN (plus GST). The 
registration cut off date is April 5, 2006.  
 
The conference fee includes a reception on 
Monday evening, lunches on Tuesday and 
Wednesday, and a banquet dinner on Tuesday. 
Each participant will receive a "welcome package" 
upon registration. Register early, as the number 
of delegates is limited and past conferences 
have sold out prior to the registration cut-off 
date.  
 
Conference attire is business casual. 
 
For more information visit 
www.policeleadership.org 
 
 
